APPENDIX 1

SCOTTISH BORDERS COUNCIL

TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY (incorporating the Annual Investment Strategy) 2022/23

CONTENTS

1 Purpose and Scope

1.1 The Council is currently required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main reports on treasury activity each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actual figures.

a) Treasury Management Strategy (this report) – The first, and most important of the three reports, is forward looking and covers:

- The capital plans of the Council (including prudential indicators);
- A policy for the statutory repayment of debt, (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
- The treasury management strategy (how the investments and borrowings are organised), including treasury indicators, and
- A permitted investment strategy (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).

b) Mid Year Treasury Management Report – This is primarily a progress report and will update members on the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether any policies require revision.

c) Annual Treasury Report – This is a backward looking review document and provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

1.2 Scrutiny
These reports are required to be adequately scrutinised by committee before being recommended to the Council. This role is undertaken by the **Audit and Srutiny Committee**.

1.3 The treasury management issues covered by this report are:

Capital Issues

- the capital expenditure plans and the associated prudential indicators;
- the loans fund repayment policy.

Treasury management issues

- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which will limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- the policy on use of external service providers

1.4 These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government in Scotland Act 2003, the CIFPA Prudential Code (the Prudential Code), the CIPFA Treasury Management Code (the Code) and Scottish Government loans fund repayment regulations and investment regulations.

1.5 The increased Member consideration of treasury management matters and the need to ensure that officers dealing with treasury management are trained and kept up to date requires a suitable training process for Members and officers. This Council will continue to address this important issue by:

a) **Elected Members**

- Working with members of the Audit and Scrutiny Committee to identify their training needs
- Working with Link Asset Services to identify appropriate training provision for elected members

b) **Officers** dealing with treasury management matters will have the option of various levels of training including:

- Treasury courses run by the Council's advisers
- Attendance at CIPFA treasury management training events
- Attendance at the CIPFA Scottish Treasury Management Forum and information exchanged via the Treasury Management Forum network
- On the job training in line with the approved Treasury Management Practices (TMPs).

1.6 Treasury Management Consultants

The Council uses Link Group, Treasury solutions as its external treasury management advisors.

The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the Council at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon the services of our external service providers. All decisions will be undertaken with regards to all available information, including, but not solely, our treasury advisers.

It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

1.7 The Treasury Management Strategy covers the treasury management activities for the Council (including any subsidiary organisations), the cash managed by the Council on behalf of the Scottish Borders Council Pension Fund, the Common Good and Trust Funds.

1.8 2021 revised CIPFA Treasury Management Code and Prudential Code – changes which will impact on future TMSS/AIS reports and the risk management framework

CIPFA published the revised codes on 20th December 2021 and has stated that formal adoption is not required until the 2023/24 financial year. This Council has to have regard to these codes of practice when it prepares the Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy, and also related reports during the financial year, which are taken to Full Council for approval.

The revised codes will have the following implications:

- a requirement for the Council to adopt a new debt liability benchmark treasury indicator to support the financing risk management of the capital financing requirement;
- clarify what CIPFA expects a local authority to borrow for and what they do not view as appropriate. This will include the requirement to set a proportionate approach to commercial and service capital investment;
- address ESG issues within the Capital Strategy;
- require implementation of a policy to review commercial property, with a view to divest where appropriate;
- create new Investment Practices to manage risks associated with non-treasury investment (similar to the current Treasury Management Practices);
- ensure that any long term treasury investment is supported by a business model;
- a requirement to effectively manage liquidity and longer term cash flow requirements;
- amendment to TMP1 to address ESG policy within the treasury management risk framework;

- amendment to the knowledge and skills register for individuals involved in the treasury management function - to be proportionate to the size and complexity of the treasury management conducted by each council;
- a new requirement to clarify reporting requirements for service and commercial investment, (especially where supported by borrowing/leverage).

In addition, all investments and investment income must be attributed to one of the following three purposes:

Treasury management
Arising from the organisation's cash flows or treasury risk management activity, this type of investment represents balances which are only held until the cash is required for use. Treasury investments may also arise from other treasury risk management activity which seeks to prudently manage the risks, costs or income relating to existing or forecast debt or treasury investments.

Service delivery
Investments held primarily and directly for the delivery of public services including housing, regeneration and local infrastructure. Returns on this category of investment which are funded by borrowing are permitted only in cases where the income is "either related to the financial viability of the project in question or otherwise incidental to the primary purpose".

Commercial return
Investments held primarily for financial return with no treasury management or direct service provision purpose. Risks on such investments should be proportionate to a council's financial capacity – i.e., that 'plausible losses' could be absorbed in budgets or reserves without unmanageable detriment to local services. An authority must not borrow to invest primarily for financial return.

As this Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy deals soley with treasury management investments, the categories of service delivery and commercial investments will be dealt with as part of the Capital Strategy report, however at the present time this Council does not have any service delivery or commercial investments.

Members will be updated on how all these changes will impact our current approach and any changes required will be formally adopted within the 2023/24 TMSS report.

1.9 International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 16 - Leasing

From 1 April 2022, leases which were previously off balance sheet will now be included. As leases form part of the other long term liability figures which make up the Prudential Indicators below, it is possible that the Indicators currently suggested will be exceeded. The data gathering has been substantially completed and the financial implications are currently being assessed. Once this exercise is completed, later in the 2022/23 financial year, an updated report may be required to inform the members of the detailed impact of IFRS 16 with amended Prudential Indicators for approval.

2 Background

2.1 The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.

2.2 The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans and strategy. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning, to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion, when it is prudent and economic, any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

2.3 The Prudential and Treasury Indicators (summarised in **Annex A**) consider the affordability and impact of capital expenditure decisions, and set out the Council's overall capital framework. These Indicators have been developed in line with both the Prudential and Treasury Codes. The treasury service considers the effective funding of these decisions. Together they form part of the process which ensures the Council meets its balanced budget requirement under the Local Government Finance Act 1992. The Treasury Management Strategy therefore forms an integral part of the Council's overall Financial Strategy covering both its revenue and capital budgets.

2.4 The contribution the treasury management function makes to the authority is critical, as the balance of debt and investment operations ensure liquidity or the ability to meet spending commitments as they fall due, either on day-to-day revenue or for larger capital projects. The treasury operations will see a balance of the interest costs of debt and the investment income arising from cash deposits affecting the available budget. Since cash balances generally result from reserves and balances, it is paramount to ensure adequate security of the sums invested, as a loss of principal will in effect result in a loss to the General Fund Balance.

2.5 Whilst any loans to third parties, commercial investment initiatives or other non-financial investments will impact on the treasury function, these activities are generally classed as non-treasury activities and are separate from the day to day treasury management activities.

2.6 CIPFA defines treasury management as:

"The management of the local authority's borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."

2.7 Revised reporting was introduced in the 2019/20 reporting cycle due to revisions to the CIPFA Prudential Code and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code. The primary reporting changes included the introduction of a capital strategy, to provide a longer-term focus to the capital plans, and greater reporting requirements surrounding any commercial activity if that is going to be undertaken. The capital strategy is being reported separately.

3 The Capital Prudential Indicators 2021/22 – 2026/27

The Council's Financial Strategy sets out financial resource and management parameters within which it will deliver its Corporate Vision and Priorities. The Financial Strategy brings together various elements of financial policy and strategy, including the Treasury Management Strategy, and establishes the financial planning framework for the Council in terms of Revenue Expenditure and Capital Investment. The output from this framework is the Council's Financial Plan, approved annually in February, presenting the financial proposals for delivering its services and objectives.

The Financial Strategy establishes that the Financial Principles underpinning the planning for the Council's future service delivery are to:

(i) Raise the funds required by the Council to meet approved service levels in the most effective manner;
(ii) Manage the effective deployment of those funds in line with the Council's corporate objectives and priorities; and
(iii) Provide stability in resource planning and service delivery as expressed through Corporate and Business Plans and the Revenue and Capital Financial Plan.

In order to adhere to these Principles, the Financial Strategy states that the Council will adopt Financial Objectives to:

"ensure capital borrowing is within prudential borrowing limits and sustainable in the longer term. In this regard it is important to recognise the capital investment decisions taken now have long term borrowing implications and these have the potential to place a significant burden on future tax payers".

The draft revenue budget sets loans charges associated with capital borrowing over the next 5 years at £17.9m in 2022/23, rising to £25.4m in 2026/27.

The Council's Capital Financial Plan is the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

3.1 Capital Expenditure (Prudential Indicator PI-1)

This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this planning cycle. The Capital Financial Plan for 2022/23 – 2031/32 includes the following capital expenditure forecasts for the first five years. 2021/22 projected outturn figures are also shown:

Capital Expenditure (PI-1)	**Estimate**					
£m	**2021/22**	**2022/23**	**2023/24**	**2024/25**	**2025/26**	**2026/27**
Assets & Infrastructure	41.4	45.6	29.2	14.8	13.5	12.6
Other Corporate Services	9.8	12.7	3.9	0.2	0.1	0.5
Children & Young People	6.7	24.3	42.3	65.5	36.3	18.2
Culture & Sport	1.1	2.1	0.6	0.6	2.0	0.7
Economic Regeneration	5.7	14.8	30.5	23.4	14.2	15.3
Housing Strategy & Services	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Social Care Infrastructure	0.7	3.1	10.6	1.6	8.5	0.1
Emergency & Unplanned Schemes	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Total	**66.2**	**103.3**	**117.8**	**106.8**	**75.3**	**48.1**

3.2 Capital Financing Assumptions

The table below summarises the above capital expenditure plans and how these plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a financing need.

Capital Expenditure £m	Estimate					
	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	2025/26	2026/27
Capital Expenditure – per plan	66.2	103.3	117.8	106.8	75.3	48.1
Other Relevant Expenditure	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Expenditure	**66.2**	**103.3**	**117.8**	**106.8**	**75.3**	**48.1**
Financed by:						
Capital receipts	0.6	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
CFCR	1.4	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Developer Contributions	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1
Govt. General Capital Grants	32.2	3.8	11.0	11.0	11.0	11.0
Govt. Specific Capital Grants	1.2	21.4	10.6	0.7	1.5	0.2
Other Grants & Contributions	8.9	24.5	33.6	22.6	14.1	15.2
Plant & Vehicle / Infrastructure Fund	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Synthetic Pitch Replacement Fund	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.4	1.1	0.5
Element of Net financing need for the year met by borrowing	**19.7**	**43.7**	**60.0**	**69.9**	**45.5**	**19.1**

3.3 The Council's Borrowing Need (the Capital Financing Requirement – Prudential Indicator PI-2)

a) The second prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's indebtedness and so its underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure identified above, which has not immediately been paid for through a revenue or capital resource, will increase the CFR. The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as prudent annual repayments from revenue need to be made which reflect the useful life of capital assets financed by borrowing. From 1 April 2016, authorities may choose whether to use scheduled debt amortisation (loans pool charges), or another suitable method of calculation in order to repay borrowing.

b) The CFR includes any other long term liabilities (e.g. PFI schemes, finance leases). Whilst these increase the CFR, and therefore the Council's borrowing requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility by the PFI, PPP lease provider and so the Council is not required to separately borrow for these schemes. The Council has £94.1m of liabilities relating to such schemes within the 2020/21 long term liabilities figure. The CFR may be impacted by the changes under IFRS 16 (see 1.9 above).

c) The Council is asked to approve the CFR projections on the page below:

Capital Financing Requirement (PI-2) £m	Actual	Estimate					
	20/21	21/22	22/23	23/24	24/25	25/26	26/27
Total CFR (PI-2) *	**350.1**	**351.1**	**381.1**	**426.3**	**481.0**	**510.4**	**513.0**
Movement in CFR represented by:							
Net financing need for the year (above)		**19.7**	**43.7**	**60.0**	**69.9**	**45.5**	**19.1**
Less scheduled debt amortisation and other financing movements		(18.7)	(13.7)	(14.8)	(15.2)	(16.1)	(16.5)
Movement in CFR		**1.0**	**30.0**	**45.2**	**54.7**	**29.4**	**2.6**

* *The CFR for this calculation includes capital expenditure to 31 March of each financial year.*

d) A key aspect of the regulatory and professional guidance is that elected members are aware of the size and scope of any commercial activity in relation to the authority's overall financial position. The capital expenditure figures shown in 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, and the details above, demonstrate the scope of this activity and, by approving these figures, consider the scale proportionate to the Authority's remaining activity. This Council does not currently have any commercial activity.

3.4 Statutory Repayment of Loans Fund Advances

a) The Council is required to set out its policy for the statutory repayment of loans fund advances prior to the start of the financial year. The repayment of loans fund advances ensures that the Council makes a prudent provision each year to pay off an element of the accumulated loans fund advances made in previous financial years.

b) A variety of options are provided to Councils so long as a prudent provision is made each year. The Council is recommended to approve the following policy on the repayment of loans fund advances:-

For loans fund advances made before 1 April 2016, the policy will be to maintain the practice of previous years and apply the **Statutory Method (option 1)**, with all loans fund advances being repaid by the annuity method.

For loans fund advances made after 1 April 2016, the policy for the repayment of loans advances will be the:-

1. **Asset life method** – loans fund advances will be repaid with reference to the life of an asset using either the equal instalment or annuity method (option 3).

Under regulation 14 (2) of SSI 2016 No 123, the Council calculates the annuity rate based on historic annuity rates to ensure that it is a prudent application and it is currently 3.63%.

4 Treasury Management Strategy

The capital expenditure plans set out in Section 3 provide details of the service activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the relevant professional Codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity and the Council's capital strategy. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

4.1 Current Portfolio Position

a) The overall treasury management portfolio as at 31 March 2021 and for the position as at 31 December 2021 are shown below for both borrowing and investments.

TREASURY PORTFOLIO				
	actual **31.3.21**	actual **31.3.21**	current **31.12.21**	current **31.12.21**
Treasury investments	£000	%	£000	%
banks	2,913	10%	2,162	10%
DMADF (H.M.Treasury)	0	0%	0	0%
money market funds	25,000	90%	19,000	90%
Total managed in house	**27,913**	**100%**	**21,162**	**100%**
Total managed externally	**0**	**0%**	**0**	**0%**
Total treasury investments	**27,913**	**100%**	**21,162**	**100%**
Treasury external borrowing				
local authorities	15,000	7%	0	0%
third party loans	600	0%	600	0%
PWLB	166,369	77%	156,086	82%
LOBOs	35,000	16%	35,000	18%
Total external borrowing	**216,969**	**100%**	**191,686**	**100%**
Net treasury investments / (borrowing)	**(189,056)**	**0**	**(170,524)**	**0**

b) The Council's forward projections for borrowing are summarised below. The table shows the actual external debt, against the underlying capital borrowing need, (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

as at 31 March £m	**Estimate**					
	2021/22	**2022/23**	**2023/24**	**2024/25**	**2025/26**	**2026/27**
Borrowing	201.2	242.4	285.3	341.0	378.5	390.5
Other Long Term Liabilities	89.1	84.3	79.7	75.5	71.0	66.7
Total Gross Borrowing (Prudential Indicator PI-5)	**290.3**	**326.7**	**365.0**	**416.5**	**449.5**	**457.2**
Capital Financing Requirement*	**426.3**	**481.0**	**510.4**	**513.0**	**498.7**	**483.7**
(Under) / Over Borrowing (Prudential Indicator PI-6)	**(136.0)**	**(154.3)**	**(145.4)**	**(96.5)**	**(49.2)**	**(26.5)**

** The CFR for this calculation includes the current and two future years projected capital expenditure see 4.1b)*

c) Within the range of prudential indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Council operates its activities within well-defined limits. One of these (PI-6) is that the Council needs to ensure

that its gross debt figure (shown above) does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2022/23 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue or speculative purposes.

d) The Council has complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and no difficulties are currently envisaged for the long term future. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in the Financial Plans for 2022/23.

4.2 Treasury Indicators: Limits to Borrowing Activity

The Operational Boundary (Prudential Indicator PI-7)

a) This is the limit beyond which external borrowing is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt and the ability to fund under-borrowing by other cash resources.

Operational boundary £m	Estimate					
	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	2025/26	2026/27
Total Operational Boundary (PI-7a)	**394.1**	**456.7**	**480.4**	**481.0**	**471.1**	**462.0**
Less: Other long term liabilities	(89.1)	(84.3)	(79.7)	(75.5)	(71.0)	(66.7)
Operational Boundary exc. Other Long Term Liabilities (PI-7b)	**305.0**	**372.4**	**400.7**	**405.5**	**400.1**	**395.3**

b) The following chart shows how the current and projected Operational Borrowing limit compare with the anticipated levels of actual debt.



The Authorised Limit for External Debt (Prudential Indicator PI-8)

c) A further key prudential indicator represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a legal limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. It reflects the level of external debt which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.

d) The authorised limits for external debt for the current year and two subsequent years are the legislative limits determined under Regulation 6(1) of the Local Authority (Capital Finance and Accounting) (Scotland) Regulations 2016.

e) The Council is asked to approve the following authorised limit:

Authorised Limit £m	Estimate					
	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	2025/26	2026/27
Total Authorised Limit (PI-8a)	**472.9**	**548.0**	**576.5**	**577.2**	**565.3**	**554.4**
Less: Other long term liabilities	(89.1)	(84.3)	(79.7)	(75.5)	(71.0)	(66.7)
Authorised Limit exc. Other Long-Term Liabilities (PI-8b)	**383.8**	**463.7**	**496.8**	**501.7**	**494.3**	**487.7**

f) The chart on the below shows how the current and projected Capital Financing Requirement compares to the Authorised Limit for External Debt



4.3 Prospects for Interest Rates

a) The Council has appointed Link Group as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. Link provided the following forecasts on 20.12.21. These are forecasts for certainty rates, gilt yields plus 80bps:

Link Group Interest Rate View 20.12.21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24	Jun-24	Sep-24	Dec-24	Mar-25
BANK RATE	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25
3 month ave earnings	0.20	0.30	0.50	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
6 month ave earnings	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10
12 month ave earnings	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20
5 yr PWLB	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00
10 yr PWLB	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.30
25 yr PWLB	1.80	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50
50 yr PWLB	1.50	1.70	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30

Additional notes by Link on this forecast table: -

- *LIBOR and LIBID rates will cease from the end of 2021. Work is currently progressing to replace LIBOR with a rate based on SONIA (Sterling Overnight Index Average). In the meantime, our forecasts are based on expected average earnings by local authorities for 3 to 12 months.*
- *Our forecasts for average earnings are averages i.e., rates offered by individual banks may differ significantly from these averages, reflecting their different needs for borrowing short term cash at any one point in time.*

b) Over the last two years, the coronavirus outbreak has done huge economic damage to the UK and to economies around the world. After the Bank of England took emergency action in March 2020 to cut Bank Rate to 0.10%, it left Bank Rate unchanged at its subsequent meetings until raising it to 0.25% at its meeting on 16 December 2021. As shown in the forecast table above, the forecast for Bank Rate now includes four increases, one in December 2021 to 0.25%, then quarter 2 of 2022 to 0.50%, quarter 1 of 2023 to 0.75%, quarter 1 of 2024 to 1.00% and, finally, one in quarter 1 of 2025 to 1.25%.

c) Significant risks to the forecasts:

- **Mutations** of the virus render current vaccines ineffective, and tweaked vaccines to combat these mutations are delayed, or cannot be administered fast enough to prevent further lockdowns. 25% of the population not being vaccinated is also a significant risk to the NHS being overwhelmed and lockdowns being the only remaining option.

- **Labour and supply shortages** prove more enduring and disruptive and depress economic activity.

- **The Monetary Policy Committee** acts too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.

- **The Monetary Policy Committee** tightens monetary policy too late to ward off building inflationary pressures.

- **The Government** acts too quickly to cut expenditure to balance the national budget.

- **UK / EU trade arrangements** – if there was a major impact on trade flows and financial services due to complications or lack of co-operation in sorting out significant remaining issues.

- **Longer term US treasury yields** rise strongly and pull gilt yields up higher than forecast.

- **Major stock markets** e.g., in the US, become increasingly judged as being over-valued and susceptible to major price corrections. Central banks become increasingly exposed to the "moral hazard" risks of having to buy shares and corporate bonds to reduce the impact of major financial market selloffs on the general economy.

- **Geopolitical risks,** for example in Ukraine, Iran, North Korea, but also in Europe and Middle Eastern countries; on-going global power influence struggles between Russia/China/US. These could lead to increasing safe-haven flows.

d) The balance of risks to the UK economy - the overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is now to the downside, including risks from Covid and its variants, both domestically and their potential effects worldwide.

e) Forecasts for Bank Rate - It is not expected that Bank Rate will go up fast after the initial rate rise as the supply potential of the economy is not likely to have taken a major hit during the pandemic: it should, therefore, be able to cope well with meeting demand after supply shortages subside over the next year, without causing inflation to remain elevated in the medium-term, or to inhibit inflation

from falling back towards the MPC's 2% target after the spike up to around 5%. The forecast includes four increases in Bank Rate over the three-year forecast period to March 2025, ending at 1.25%. However, it is likely that these forecasts will need changing within a relatively short timeframe for the following reasons:

- We do not know how severe an impact Omicron could have on the economy and whether there will be another lockdown or similar and, if there is, whether there would be significant fiscal support from the Government for businesses and jobs.

- There were already increasing grounds for viewing the economic recovery as running out of steam during the autumn and now into the winter. And then along came Omicron to pose a significant downside threat to economic activity. This could lead into stagflation, or even into recession, which would then pose a dilemma for the MPC as to whether to focus on combating inflation or supporting economic growth through keeping interest rates low.

- Will some current key supply shortages spill over into causing economic activity in some sectors to take a significant hit?

- Rising gas and electricity prices in October and next April and increases in other prices caused by supply shortages and increases in taxation next April, are already going to deflate consumer spending power without the MPC having to take any action on Bank Rate to cool inflation.

- On the other hand, consumers are sitting on over £160bn of excess savings left over from the pandemic so when will they spend this sum, in part or in total?

- It looks as if the economy coped well with the end of furlough on 30th September. It is estimated that there were around 1 million people who came off furlough then and there was not a huge spike up in unemployment. The other side of the coin is that vacancies have been hitting record levels so there is a continuing acute shortage of workers. This is a potential danger area if this shortage drives up wages which then feed through into producer prices and the prices of services i.e., a second-round effect that the MPC would have to act against if it looked like gaining significant momentum.

- We also recognise there could be further nasty surprises on the Covid front beyond the Omicron mutation.

- If the UK invokes article 16 of the Brexit deal over the dislocation in trading arrangements with Northern Ireland, this has the potential to end up in a no-deal Brexit

f) In summary, with the high level of uncertainty prevailing on several different fronts, we expect to have to revise our forecasts again - in line with whatever the new news is. It should also be borne in mind that Bank Rate being cut to 0.25% and then to 0.10%, were emergency measures to deal with the Covid crisis hitting the UK in March 2020. At any time, the MPC could decide to simply take away such emergency cuts on no other grounds than they are no longer warranted, and as a step forward in the return to normalisation. In addition, any Bank Rate under 1% is both highly unusual and highly supportive of economic growth.

g) **Forecasts for PWLB rates and gilt and treasury yields**. Since the start of 2021, we have seen a lot of volatility in gilt yields, and hence PWLB rates. As the interest forecast table for PWLB certainty rates above shows, there is forecast to be a steady, but slow, rise in both Bank Rate and gilt yields during the forecast period to March 2025, though there will doubtless be a lot of unpredictable volatility during this forecast period. While monetary policy in the UK will have a major impact on gilt yields, there is also a need to consider the potential impact that rising treasury yields in America could have on our gilt yields. **As an average since 2011, there has been a 75% correlation between movements in US 10-year treasury yields and UK 10-year gilt yields. This is a significant <u>UPWARD RISK</u> exposure to our forecasts for longer term PWLB rates. However, gilt yields and treasury yields do not always move in unison.**

h) **US treasury yields.** During the first part of 2021, US President Biden's, and the Democratic party's, determination to push through a $1.9trn (equivalent to 8.8% of GDP) fiscal boost for the US economy as a recovery package from the Covid pandemic was what unsettled financial markets. However, this was in addition to the $900bn support package already passed in December 2020. This was then followed by additional Democratic ambition to spend $1trn on infrastructure, (which was eventually passed by both houses later in 2021), and an even larger sum on an American families plan over the next decade; this is still caught up in Democrat / Republican haggling. Financial markets were alarmed that all this stimulus was happening at a time when:

1. A fast vaccination programme had enabled a rapid opening up of the economy during 2021.
2. The economy was growing strongly during the first half of 2021 although it has weakened overall during the second half.
3. It started from a position of little spare capacity due to less severe lockdown measures than in many other countries.
4. And the Fed was still providing substantial stimulus through monthly QE purchases during 2021.

It was not much of a surprise that a combination of these factors would eventually cause an excess of demand in the economy which generated strong inflationary pressures. This has eventually been recognised by the Fed at its December meeting with an aggressive response to damp inflation down during 2022 and 2023.

At its 3rd November Fed meeting, the Fed decided to make a start on tapering its $120bn per month of QE purchases so that they ended next June. However, at its **15th December meeting** it doubled the pace of tapering so that they will end all purchases in February. These purchases are currently acting as downward pressure on treasury yields and so it would be expected that Treasury yields will rise over the taper period and after the taper ends, all other things being equal. The Fed also forecast that it expected there would be three rate rises in 2022 of 0.25% from near zero currently, followed by three in 2023 and two in 2024, taking rates back above 2% to a neutral level for monetary policy.

i) There are also possible **DOWNSIDE RISKS** from the huge sums of cash that the UK populace have saved during the pandemic; when savings accounts earn little interest, it is likely that some of this cash mountain could end up being invested in bonds and so push up demand for bonds and support their prices i.e., this would help to keep their yields down. How this will interplay with the Bank of England eventually getting round to not reinvesting maturing gilts and then later selling gilts, will be interesting to monitor.

j) There is likely to be **exceptional volatility and unpredictability in respect of gilt yields and PWLB rates** due to the following factors:

- How strongly will changes in gilt yields be correlated to changes in US treasury yields (see below). Over 10 years since 2011 there has been an average 75% correlation between movements in US treasury yields and gilt yields. However, from time to time these two yields can diverge. Lack of spare economic capacity and rising inflationary pressures are viewed as being much greater dangers in the US than in the UK. This could mean that central bank rates will end up rising earlier and higher in the US than in the UK if inflationary pressures were to escalate; the consequent increases in treasury yields could well spill over to cause (lesser) increases in gilt yields. There is, therefore, an upside risk to forecasts for gilt yields due to this correlation. The Link Group forecasts have included a risk of a 75% correlation between the two yields.
- Will the Fed take action to counter increasing treasury yields if they rise beyond a yet unspecified level?
- Would the MPC act to counter increasing gilt yields if they rise beyond a yet unspecified level?
- How strong will inflationary pressures actually turn out to be in both the US and the UK and so put upward pressure on treasury and gilt yields?

- How will central banks implement their new average or sustainable level inflation monetary policies?
- How well will central banks manage the withdrawal of QE purchases of their national bonds i.e., without causing a panic reaction in financial markets as happened in the "taper tantrums" in the US in 2013?
- Will exceptional volatility be focused on the short or long-end of the yield curve, or both?

k) As the US financial markets are, by far, the biggest financial markets in the world, any upward trend in treasury yields will invariably impact and influence financial markets in other countries. Inflationary pressures and erosion of surplus economic capacity look much stronger in the US compared to those in the UK, which would suggest that Fed rate increases eventually needed to suppress inflation, are likely to be faster and stronger than Bank Rate increases in the UK. This is likely to put upward pressure on treasury yields which could then spill over into putting upward pressure on UK gilt yields. The forecasts are also predicated on an assumption that there is no break-up of the Eurozone or EU within the forecasting period, despite the major challenges that are looming up, and that there are no major ructions in international relations, especially between the US and Russia, China / North Korea and Iran, which have a major impact on international trade and world GDP growth.

l) **The balance of risks to medium to long term PWLB rates** - there is a balance of upside risks to forecasts for medium to long term PWLB rates.

m) **10.1.22 UPDATE TO FORECASTS:** The Fed minutes for their December 14-15 meeting were released last week. These showed there is a very likely going to be an acceleration in the pace of monetary tightening policies including a faster rate of increase in the Fed rate and running down the stock of QE purchases. This has led to a sharp jump up in treasury yields, and also in gilt yields in this country. It is also now clearer that there could be a 50% increase in the price cap on fuel prices from 1st April 2022 in this country: this could boost inflation significantly and would then put added pressure on the Bank of England to raise Bank Rate faster as inflation would be unlikely to come down as fast as previously expected. What is still an unknown is whether the Government will damp down the calculation of inflation figures by providing some kind of subsidy for gas and electricity costs e.g., it could make loans to energy companies by spreading increased costs incurred this year over several future years as those loans are gradually repaid. **There has therefore been a sharp increase in the balance of upside risks to the forecasts for gilt yields, PWLB rates and Bank Rate.**

n) **A new era – a fundamental shift in central bank monetary policy.** One of the key results of the pandemic has been a fundamental rethinking and shift in monetary policy by major central banks like the Fed, the Bank of England and the ECB, to tolerate a higher level of inflation than in the previous two decades when inflation was the prime target to bear down on so as to stop it going above a target rate. There is now also a greater emphasis on other targets for monetary policy than just inflation, especially on 'achieving broad and inclusive "maximum" employment in its entirety' in the US, before consideration would be given to increasing rates.

- The Fed in America has gone furthest in adopting a monetary policy based on a clear goal of allowing the inflation target to be symmetrical, (rather than a ceiling to keep under), so that inflation averages out the dips down and surges above the target rate, over an unspecified period of time.
- The Bank of England has also amended its target for monetary policy so that inflation should be 'sustainably over 2%' before starting on raising Bank Rate and the ECB now has a similar policy.
- ***For local authorities, this means that investment interest rates and very short term PWLB rates will not be rising as quickly or as high as in previous decades when the economy recovers from a downturn and the recovery eventually runs out of spare capacity to fuel continuing expansion.***
- Labour market liberalisation since the 1970s has helped to break the wage-price spirals that fuelled high levels of inflation and has now set inflation on a lower path which makes this shift in monetary policy practicable. In addition, recent changes in flexible employment practices, the rise of the gig economy and technological changes, will all help to lower inflationary pressures.

- Governments will also be concerned to see interest rates stay lower as every rise in central rates will add to the cost of vastly expanded levels of national debt; (in the UK this is £21bn for each 1% rise in rates). On the other hand, higher levels of inflation will help to erode the real value of total public debt.

Investment and borrowing rates

o) **Investment returns** are expected to improve in 2022/23. However, while markets are pricing in a series of Bank Rate hikes, actual economic circumstances may see the MPC fall short of these elevated expectations.

p) **Borrowing interest rates** fell to historically very low rates as a result of the COVID crisis and the quantitative easing operations of the Bank of England and still remain at historically low levels. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served local authorities well over the last few years.

q) On 25.11.20, the Chancellor announced the conclusion to the review of margins over gilt yields for PWLB rates which had been increased by 100 bps in October 2019. The standard and certainty margins were reduced by 100 bps but a prohibition was introduced to deny access to borrowing from the PWLB for any local authority which had purchase of assets for yield in its three-year capital programme. The current margins over gilt yields are as follows:

- **PWLB Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
- **PWLB Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80 basis points (G+80bps)
- **PWLB HRA Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
- **PWLB HRA Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80bps (G+80bps)
- **Local Infrastructure Rate** is gilt plus 60bps (G+60bps)

r) **Borrowing for capital expenditure.** Our long-term (beyond 10 years), forecast for Bank Rate is 2.00%. As some PWLB certainty rates are currently below 2.00%, there remains value in considering long-term borrowing from the PWLB where appropriate. Temporary borrowing rates are likely, however, to remain near Bank Rate and may also prove attractive as part of a balanced debt portfolio.

s) While this authority will not be able to avoid borrowing to finance new capital expenditure and to replace maturing debt, there will be a *cost of carry*, (the difference between higher borrowing costs and lower investment returns), to any new borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances.

4.4 Borrowing Strategy

a) The Council is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow has been used as a temporary measure. This strategy is prudent as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is still an issue that needs to be considered.

b) Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2022/23 treasury operations. The Director of Finance & Corporate Governance will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances:

• if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in borrowing rates, then borrowing will be postponed.

• if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in long and short term rates than that currently forecast, perhaps arising from an acceleration in the rate of increase in central rates in the USA and UK, an increase in world economic activity, or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised. Most likely, fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates are lower than they are projected to be in the next few years.

c) Any decisions will be reported to Members at the next available opportunity.

4.5 Policy on borrowing in advance of need

a) Borrowing in advance of need is defined as any borrowing undertaken by the local authority which will result in the total external debt of the local authority exceeding the capital financing requirement (CFR) of the local authority for the following twelve month period. This twelve month period is on a rolling twelve month basis.

b) The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed.

c) Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.

d) The Director of Finance & Corporate Governance has the authority to borrow in advance of need under delegated power where, for instance, a sharp rise in interest rates is expected, and so borrowing early at fixed interest rates will be economically beneficial or meet budgetary constraints. The Director of Finance & Corporate Governance will adopt a cautious approach to any such borrowing and a business case to support the decision making process must consider:

- the benefits of borrowing in advance,
- the risks created by additional levels of borrowing and investment, and
- how far in advance it is reasonable to borrow considering the risks identified

e) Any such advance borrowing should be reported through the mid-year or annual Treasury Management reporting mechanism.

4.6 Debt Rescheduling

a) Rescheduling of current borrowing in our debt portfolio is unlikely to occur as there is still a very large difference between premature redemption rates and new borrowing rates, even though the general margin of PWLB rates over gilt yields was reduced by 100 bps in November 2020.

b) All rescheduling will be reported to the **Executive** at the earliest meeting following its action.

4.7 New financial institurions as a source of borrowing and/or types of borrowing

a) Currently the PWLB Certainty Rate is set at gilts + 80 basis points for both HRA and non-HRA borrowing. However, consideration may still need to be given to sourcing funding from the following sources for the following reasons:

- Local authorities (primarily shorter dated maturities out to 3 years or so – still cheaper than the Certainty Rate).
- Financial institutions (primarily insurance companies and pension funds but also some banks, out of forward dates where the objective is to avoid a “cost of carry” or to achieve refinancing certainty over the next few years).
- Municipal Bonds Agency (possibly still a viable alternative depending on market circumstances prevailing at the time).

b) Our advisors will keep us informed as to the relative merits of each of these alternative funding sources.

5 Investment Strategy

5.1 Investment Objectives and Policy

a) The Council's investment policy implements the requirements of the following:-

- Local Government Investments (Scotland) Regulations 2010, (and accompanying Finance Circular 5/2010);
- CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes 2017, ("the Code");
- CIPFA Treasury Management Guidance Notes 2018.

b) The Council's primary investment objectives are as follows, in order of importance:

(i) The safeguarding or **security** of the re-payment of principal and interest of investments on a timely basis;
(ii) The **liquidity** of its investments;
(iii) The **returns on investments** that can be realised.

The Council will therefore aim to achieve the optimum return on its investments corresponding with proper levels of security and liquidity. The risk appetite of this Council is low in order to give priority to security of its investments. In the current economic climate it is considered appropriate to keep investments short term to cover cash flow needs, but also to seek out value available in periods up to 12 months with high credit rated financial institutions.

c) Minimum acceptable **credit criteria** are applied in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties. This also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the short term and long-term ratings.

d) **Other information**: ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To achieve this consideration the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as "**credit default swaps**" and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.

e) **Other information sources** used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

f) This authority has defined the list of **types of investment instruments** that are permitted investments authorised for use in appendix D. Appendix F expands on the risks involved in each type of investment and the mitigating controls.

g) **Lending limits**, (amounts and maturity), for each counterparty will be set through applying the matrix table in paragraph 5.3.

h) This authority has engaged **external consultants**, (see paragraph 1.5), to provide expert advice on how to optimise an appropriate balance of security, liquidity and yield, given the risk appetite of this authority in the context of the expected level of cash balances and need for liquidity throughout the year

i) All investments will be denominated in **sterling.**

j) As a result of the change in accounting standards for 2022/23 under **IFRS 9,** this authority will consider the implications of investment instruments which could result in an adverse movement in the value of the amount invested and resultant charges at the end of the year to the General Fund.

k) This authority will also pursue **value for money** in treasury management and will monitor the yield from investment income against appropriate benchmarks for investment performance, (see paragraph 5.6). Regular monitoring of investment performance will be carried out during the year.

l) The above criteria are unchanged from last year.

5.2 Council Permitted Investments

The proposed criteria for permitted investments are shown in annex D approval.

5.3 Creditworthiness Policy

a) This Council applies the creditworthiness service provided by the Link Group. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:

- credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
- Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings;
- sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

b) This modelling approach combines credit ratings, and any assigned Watches and Outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads. The end product is a series of colour coded bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are used by the Council to determine the suggested duration for investments. The Council will therefore use counterparties within the following durational bands:

Creditworthiness Colour Banding	Maximum Investment Duration
Yellow	5 years*
Dark pink	5 years for Ultra short dated bond funds with a credit score of 1.25
Light pink	5 years for Ultra short dated bond funds with a credit score of 1.5
Purple	2 years
Blue	1 year (only applies to nationalised or semi-nationalised UK Banks)
Orange	1 year
Red	6 months
Green	100 days
No colour	not to be used (ie don't invest)

Y	Pi1	Pi2	P	B	O	R	G	N/C
1	1.25	1.5	2	3	4	5	6	7
Up to 5yrs	Up to 5yrs	Up to 5yrs	Up to 2yrs	Up to 1yr	Up to 1yr	Up to 6mths	Up to 100days	No Colour

c) The Link creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information than just primary ratings. Furthermore, by using a risk weighted scoring system, it does not give undue preponderance to just one agency's ratings.

d) Typically the minimum credit ratings criteria the Council use will be a Short Term rating (Fitch or equivalents) of F1 and a Long Term rating of A-. There may be occasions when the counterparty ratings from one rating agency are marginally lower than these ratings but may still be used. In these instances consideration will be given to the whole range of ratings available, or other topical market information, to support their use.

e) All credit ratings will be monitored on a real time basis. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of a creditworthiness service provided by the Link Group.

- if a downgrade results in the counterparty / investment scheme no longer meeting the Council's minimum criteria, its further use as a new investment will be withdrawn immediately.
- in addition to the use of credit ratings the Council will be advised of information in movements in credit default swap spreads against the iTraxx benchmark and other market data on a daily basis via its Passport website, provided exclusively to it by Link. Extreme market movements may result in downgrade of an institution or removal from the Council's lending list.

f) Sole reliance will not be placed on the use of this external service. In addition, this Council will also use market data and market information, as well as information on any external support for banks to help support its decision-making process.

g) Significant levels of downgrades to Short- and Long-Term credit ratings have not materialised since the crisis in March 2020. In the main, where they did change, any alterations were limited to Outlooks. However, as economies are beginning to reopen, there have been some instances of previous lowering of Outlooks being reversed.

h) Although bank CDS prices, (these are market indicators of credit risk), spiked upwards at the end of March / early April 2020 due to the heightened market uncertainty and ensuing liquidity crisis that affected financial markets, they have returned to more average levels since then. However, sentiment can easily shift, so it will remain important to undertake continual monitoring of all aspects of risk and return in the current circumstances. Link monitor CDS prices as part of their creditworthiness service to local authorities and the Council has access to this information via its Link-provided Passport portal.

5.4 Country and Sector Considerations

a) Due care will be taken to consider the country and sector exposure of the Council's investments.

Country Limits

b) The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from the UK and from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA- from Fitch (or equivalent). The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in Appendix E. This list will be added to, or deducted from, by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy.

c) No more than **10%** will be placed with any non-UK country at any time.

Institutional Sector Limits

d) These institutions must either be UK Local Authorities or UK Incorporated Institutions, UK Banks and Building Societies incorporated in the European Economic Area entitled to accept deposits through a branch in the UK. The Council may also use the UK Government including in the form of gilts and the Debt Management Account Deposit Facility (DMADF).

e) Limits will be applied to the overall amount lent out to any one sector at any one time in order to limit sector specific exposure risk, as follows:

UK Building Societies	**£25 m**
Banks	**£35 m**
UK Local Authorities	**£40 m**
UK Government Debt Management Office	**£unlimited**
UK Gilts and Treasury Bills	**£20 m**
Institutions covered by Government Guarantee	**£10 m**
Part Nationalised Banks	**£35 m**
Money Market Funds (AAA)	**£25 m**

These limits will be monitored regularly for appropriateness.

Group Limits

g) Limits will be applied to the overall amount lent out to institutions within the same group at any one time in order to limit group specific exposure risk, as follows, and subject to the parent company appearing on Link Groups' creditworthiness list:

Group of Banks **£10m**

Council's Own Banker

h) The Council's own banker (currently Royal Bank of Scotland) will be maintained on the Council's counterparty list in situations where rating changes may mean this is below the above criteria. This is to allow the Council to continue to operate normal current account banking facilities and overnight and short-term investment facilities. However, in the event that the rating does change below the criteria, officers will review the situation carefully and identify any appropriate action required to manage the risk that this change creates for the Council.

5.5 Individual Institution Monetary Limits

a) The monetary limits for institutions on the Council's Counterparty List are as follows:

	Money Limit
UK Building Societies	£5m
Banks	£5m
UK Local Authorities (i)	£40m
UK Government Debt Management Office	Unlimited
UK Gilts & Treasury Bills	£20m
Government Guaranteed Institutions	£2m
AAA rated Money Market Funds	£5m
Council's Own Banker (ii)	£5m

(i) No individual limit will be applied on lending to a UK local authority, other than it must not exceed the relevant sector limit of £40m.

(ii) Further to Sections 5.4 and 5.5, in the event that the rating of the Council's own banker falls below the criteria, the time limit on money deposited with the bank will be reduced to an overnight basis.

b) As mentioned earlier, the treasury function manages the funds of the Council, any subsidiary organisations, the Pension Fund and the Common Good and Trust Funds. When applying the limits set out in the table above, these limits will apply to the cumulative investment with an institution from the Council, the Pension Fund and the Common Good Funds and Trust Funds.

5.6 Types of Investments

a) For institutions on the approved counterparty list, investments will be restricted to safer instruments (such as deposits). Currently this involves the use of money market funds, the

DMADF and institutions with higher credit ratings than the minimum permissible rating outlined in the investment strategy, as well as the Council's own bank.

b) Where appropriate, investments will be made through approved brokers. The current list of approved brokers comprises:

- BGC Brokers L.P.
- ICAP Securities Limited
- Sterling International Brokers Limited
- Tradition (UK) Limited

5.7 Investment Strategy and bank rate projections

In-house funds

a) Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months). Greater returns are usually obtainable by investing for longer periods. While most cash balances are required in order to manage the ups and downs of cash flow, where cash sums can be identified that could be invested for longer periods, the value to be obtained from longer term investments will be carefully assessed.

- If it is thought that Bank Rate is likely to rise significantly within the time horizon being considered, then consideration will be given to keeping most investments as being short term or variable.
- Conversely, if it is thought that Bank Rate is likely to fall within that time period, consideration will be given to locking in higher rates currently obtainable, for longer periods.

Investment returns expectations

b) The current forecast shown in paragraph 4.3, includes a forecast for a first increase in Bank Rate in May 2022, though it could come in February.

c) The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to about three months during each financial year, (based on a first increase in Bank Rate in quarter 2 of 2022), are as follows:

Average earnings in each year	
2022/23	0.50%
2023/24	0.75%
2024/25	1.00%
2025/26	1.25%
Long term later years	2.00%

Investment Treasury Indicator and Limit (Treasury Indicator TI-5)

d) Total principal funds invested for greater than 365 days. These limits are set with regard to the Council's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment, and are based on the availability of funds after each year end.

The Council is asked to approve the treasury indicator and limit:

Maximum principal sums invested for longer than 365 days (TI-5)					
£m	**2022/23**	**2023/24**	**2024/25**	**2025/26**	**2026/27**
Principal sums invested for longer than 365 days	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%

e) For positive cash balances and in order to maintain liquidity, the Council will seek to use overnight investment accounts, short term (< 1 month) notice accounts, money market funds and short-dated deposits (overnight to three months).

5.8 Investment Risk Benchmarking

These benchmarks are simple guides to maximum risk, so they may be breached from time to time, depending on movements in interest rates and counterparty criteria. The purpose of the benchmark is that officers will monitor the current and trend position and amend the operational strategy to manage risk as conditions change. Any breach of the benchmarks will be reported, with supporting reasons in the mid-year or Annual Report.

a) Security

The Council's **maximum** security risk benchmark for the current portfolio, when compared to historic default tables, is:

0.04% historic risk of default when compared to the whole portfolio.

b) Liquidity

In respect of this area the Council seeks to maintain:

- Bank Overdraft: £250,000
- Liquid short term deposits of at least £1,500,000 available with a week's notice.
- Weighted Average Life benchmark is **expected to be 0.5 years** (equivalent to an weighted average life of 6 months), with a **maximum of 1.00 years**

c) Yield

Local measures of yield benchmarks are:

Investments – **Internal returns above the 7 day SONIA compounded rate**

d) At the end of the financial year, the Director of Finance & Corporate Governance will report on its investment activity as part of the Annual Treasury Report.

6 Performance Indicators

6.1 The CIPFA Code requires the Council to set performance indicators to assess the adequacy of the treasury function over the year. These are distinct historic indicators, as opposed to the prudential indicators, which are predominantly forward looking.

6.2 Debt Performance Indicators

(i) Average "Pool Rate" charged by the Loans Fund compared to Scottish Local Authority average Pool Rate.

Target is to be at or below the Scottish Average for 2021/22.

(ii) Average borrowing rate movement year on year

Target is to maintain or reduce the average borrowing rate for the Council versus 2021/22.

6.3 **Investment Risk Benchmark Indicators** for Security, Liquidity and Yield, as set out in paragraph 5.8.

6.4 Loans Charges

a) Loans Charges for 2022/23 are expected to be at or below the Revenue Budget estimate contained in the Council's Financial Plans to be approved in February 2022, which are estimated as follows:

£m	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	2025/26	2026/27
Interest on Borrowing	10.0	10.7	11.9	13.0	13.9
Investment income	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Capital Repayments	8.0	9.0	10.2	11.0	11.6
Total Loan Charges *	**17.9**	**19.6**	**22.0**	**23.9**	**25.4**

**The Loan Charges exclude the capital element of PPP repayments.*

b) The above budget excludes the revenue impact of funding the cost of the NHT and the lending to RSLs and lending in respect of the Council-led house building programme with the Scottish Futures Trust, as these are assumed to be revenue neutral overall.

6.5 The indicators, based on actual performance for the year, will be included in the Treasury Management Annual Report for 2022/23.

ANNEXES

ANNEX A
SUMMARY OF PRUDENTIAL AND TREASURY INDICATORS

Indicator Ref.	Indicator	Page Ref.	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	2025/26
PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS							
Capital Expenditure Indicator							
PI-1	Capital Expenditure Limits (£m)	7	66.2	103.3	117.8	106.8	75.3
PI-2	Capital Financing Requirement (CFR) (£m)	9	351.1	381.1	426.3	481.0	510.4
Affordability Indicator							
PI-3	Ratio of Financing Costs to Net Revenue (inc. PPP repayment costs)	28	8.7%	8.6%	9.3%	9.7%	9.9%
PI-4	Incremental (Saving)/Cost Impact of Capital Investment Decisions on Council Tax	28	£(0.02)	£(0.01)	£(0.01)	£0.01	£0.03
External Debt Indicators							
PI-5	Actual Debt (£m)	10	290.3	326.7	365.0	416.5	449.5
PI-7a	Operational Boundary (inc. Other Long Term Liabilities) (£m)	11	394.1	456.7	480.4	481.0	471.1
PI-7b	Operational Boundary (exc. Other Long Term Liabilities) (£m)	11	305.0	372.4	400.7	405.5	400.1
PI-8a	Authorised Limit (inc. Other Long Term Liabilities) (£m)	12	472.9	548.0	576.5	577.2	565.3
PI-8b	Authorised Limit (exc. Other Long Term Liabilities) (£m)	12	383.8	463.7	496.8	501.7	494.3
Indicators of Prudence							
PI-6	(Under)/Over Gross Borrowing against the CFR (£m)	10	(136.0)	(154.3)	(145.4)	(96.5)	(49.2)
TREASURY INDICATORS							
TI-1	Upper Limit to Fixed Interest Rates based on Net Debt (£m)	29	394.1	456.7	480.4	481.0	471.1
TI-2	Upper Limit to Variable Interest Rates based on Net Debt (£m)	29	137.9	159.8	168.1	168.4	164.9
TI-3	Maturity Structure of Fixed Interest Rate Borrowing 2022/23	29	**Lower**		**Upper**		
	Under 12 months		0%		20%		
	12 months to 2 years		0%		20%		
	2 years to 5 years		0%		20%		
	5 years to 10 years		0%		20%		
	10 years and above		20%		100%		
TI-5	Maximum Principal Sum invested greater than 365 days	23	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%

Further prudential indicators are required to assess the affordability of the capital investment plans. These provide an indication of the impact of the capital investment plans on the Council's overall finances. The updated indicators are as follows:

Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream (Prudential Indicator PI-3)

This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital (borrowing and other long term obligation costs, net of investment income) against the net revenue stream.

%	Actual	Estimate				
	20/21	21/22	22/23	23/24	24/25	25/26
Ratio of Financing Costs to Net Revenue Stream (PI-3) *(inc. PPP repayment costs)*	8.9%	8.7%	8.6%	9.3%	9.7%	9.9%

The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in the Financial Plans for 2022/23. The movements in the above ratio from 2021/22 onwards reflect a real-time reduction in overall financial resources available to the Council.

Incremental impact of capital investment decisions on council tax (Prudential Indicator PI-4)

This indicator identifies the revenue costs associated with the operational three year capital programme detailed in this budget report compared to the Council's existing approved commitments and current plans. The assumptions are based on the budget, but will invariably include some estimates, such as the level of Government support, which are not published over a three year period.

£	Estimate				
	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	2025/26
Incremental (Saving)/Cost Impact of Capital Investment Decisions on the Band D Council Tax (PI-4)	£(0.02)	£(0.01)	£(0.01)	£0.01	£0.03

Treasury Management Limits on Activity

There are three debt related treasury activity limits. The purpose of these are to restrain the activity of the treasury function within certain limits, thereby managing risk and reducing the impact of any adverse movement in interest rates. However, if these are set to be too restrictive, they will impair the opportunities to reduce costs / improve performance. The indicators are:

(i) Upper limits on fixed interest rate exposure (Treasury Indicator TI-1)

This identifies a maximum limit for borrowing exposure to fixed interest rates, based on the debt position net of investments.

(ii) Upper limits on variable interest rate exposure (Treasury Indicator TI-2)

This identifies a maximum limit for borrowing exposure to variable interest rates based upon the debt position net of investments.

(iii) Maturity structure of borrowing (Treasury Indicator TI-3)

These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits.

(iv) The following table highlights the proposed treasury indicators and limits:

£m	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	2025/26
Interest rate exposures					
	Upper	**Upper**	**Upper**	**Upper**	**Upper**
Limits on fixed interest rates based on net debt (TI-1)	394.1	456.7	480.4	481.0	471.1
Limits on variable interest rates based on net debt (TI-2)	137.9	159.8	168.1	168.4	164.9
Maturity Structure of fixed interest rate borrowing 2022/23 (TI-3)					
		Lower		**Upper**	
Under 12 months		0%		20%	
12 months to 2 years		0%		20%	
2 years to 5 years		0%		20%	
5 years to 10 years		0%		20%	
10 years and above		20%		100%	

ANNEX B: INTEREST RATE FORECASTS 2021-25

[PWLB rates and forecast shown below have taken into account the 20 basis point certainty rate reduction effective as of the 1st November 2012.]

Link Group Interest Rate View	20.12.21													
	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24	Jun-24	Sep-24	Dec-24	Mar-25
BANK RATE	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25
3 month ave earnings	0.20	0.30	0.50	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
6 month ave earnings	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10
12 month ave earnings	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20
5 yr PWLB	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00
10 yr PWLB	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.30
25 yr PWLB	1.80	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50
50 yr PWLB	1.50	1.70	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30
Bank Rate														
Link	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25
Capital Economics	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	-	-	-	-	-
5yr PWLB Rate														
Link	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00
Capital Economics	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.90	-	-	-	-	-
10yr PWLB Rate														
Link	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.30
Capital Economics	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	2.00	2.00	-	-	-	-	-
25yr PWLB Rate														
Link	1.80	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50
Capital Economics	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.30	-	-	-	-	-
50yr PWLB Rate														
Link	1.50	1.70	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30
Capital Economics	1.40	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.90	2.00	2.20	2.30	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Link Asset Services, December 2021

ANNEX C
Economic Background

COVID-19 vaccines.

These were the game changer during 2021 which raised high hopes that life in the UK would be able to largely return to normal in the second half of the year. However, the bursting onto the scene of the Omicron mutation at the end of November, rendered the initial two doses of all vaccines largely ineffective in preventing infection. This has dashed such hopes and raises the spectre again that a fourth wave of the virus could overwhelm hospitals in early 2022. What we now know is that this mutation is very fast spreading with the potential for total case numbers to double every two to three days, although it possibly may not cause so much severe illness as previous mutations. Rather than go for full lockdowns which heavily damage the economy, the government strategy this time is focusing on getting as many people as possible to have a third (booster) vaccination after three months from the previous last injection, as a booster has been shown to restore a high percentage of immunity to Omicron to those who have had two vaccinations. There is now a race on between how quickly boosters can be given to limit the spread of Omicron, and how quickly will hospitals fill up and potentially be unable to cope. In the meantime, workers have been requested to work from home and restrictions have been placed on large indoor gatherings and hospitality venues. With the household saving rate having been exceptionally high since the first lockdown in March 2020, there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for services in sectors like restaurants, travel, tourism and hotels which had been hit hard during 2021, but could now be hit hard again by either, or both, of government restrictions and/or consumer reluctance to leave home. Growth will also be lower due to people being ill and not working, similar to the pingdemic in July. The economy, therefore, faces significant headwinds although some sectors have learned how to cope well with Covid. However, the biggest impact on growth would come from another lockdown if that happened. The big question still remains as to whether any further mutations of this virus could develop which render all current vaccines ineffective, as opposed to how quickly vaccines can be modified to deal with them and enhanced testing programmes be implemented to contain their spread until tweaked vaccines become widely available.

A SUMMARY OVERVIEW OF THE FUTURE PATH OF BANK RATE

- In December, the Bank of England became the first major western central bank to put interest rates up in this upswing in the current business cycle in western economies as recovery progresses from the Covid recession of 2020.
- The next increase in Bank Rate could be in February or May, dependent on how severe an impact there is from Omicron.
- If there are lockdowns in January, this could pose a barrier for the MPC to putting Bank Rate up again as early as 3rd February.
- With inflation expected to peak at around 6% in April, the MPC may want to be seen to be active in taking action to counter inflation on 5th May, the release date for its Quarterly Monetary Policy Report.
- The December 2021 MPC meeting was more concerned with combating inflation over the medium term than supporting economic growth in the short term.
- Bank Rate increases beyond May are difficult to forecast as inflation is likely to drop sharply in the second half of 2022.
- However, the MPC will want to normalise Bank Rate over the next three years so that it has its main monetary policy tool ready to use in time for the next down-turn; all rates under 2% are providing stimulus to economic growth.
- We have put year end 0.25% increases into Q1 of each financial year from 2023 to recognise this upward bias in Bank Rate - but the actual timing in each year is difficult to predict.
- Covid remains a major potential downside threat in all three years as we ARE likely to get further mutations.

- How quickly can science come up with a mutation proof vaccine, or other treatment, – and for them to be widely administered around the world?
- Purchases of gilts under QE ended in December. Note that when Bank Rate reaches 0.50%, the MPC has said it will start running down its stock of QE.

MPC MEETING 16H DECEMBER 2021

- The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted 8-1 to raise Bank Rate by 0.15% from 0.10% to 0.25% and unanimously decided to make no changes to its programme of quantitative easing purchases due to finish in December 2021 at a total of £895bn.

- The MPC disappointed financial markets by not raising Bank Rate at its November meeting. Until Omicron burst on the scene, most forecasters, therefore, viewed a Bank Rate increase as being near certain at this December meeting due to the way that inflationary pressures have been comprehensively building in both producer and consumer prices, and in wage rates. However, at the November meeting, the MPC decided it wanted to have assurance that the labour market would get over the end of the furlough scheme on 30th September without unemployment increasing sharply; their decision was, therefore, to wait until statistics were available to show how the economy had fared at this time.

- **On 10th December we learnt of the disappointing 0.1% m/m rise in GDP** in October which suggested that economic growth had already slowed to a crawl even before the Omicron variant was discovered in late November. Early evidence suggests growth in November might have been marginally better. Nonetheless, at such low rates of growth, the government's "Plan B" COVID-19 restrictions could cause the economy to contract in December.

- **On 14th December, the labour market statistics** for the three months to October and the single month of October were released. The fallout after the furlough scheme was smaller and shorter than the Bank of England had feared. The single-month data were more informative and showed that LFS employment fell by 240,000, unemployment increased by 75,000 and the unemployment rate rose from 3.9% in September to 4.2%. However, the weekly data suggested this didn't last long as unemployment was falling again by the end of October. What's more, the 49,700 fall in the claimant count and the 257,000 rise in the PAYE measure of company payrolls suggests that the labour market strengthened again in November. The other side of the coin was a further rise in the number of vacancies from 1.182m to a record 1.219m in the three months to November which suggests that the supply of labour is struggling to keep up with demand, although the single-month figure for November fell for the first time since February, from 1.307m to 1.227m.

- These figures by themselves, would probably have been enough to give the MPC the assurance that it could press ahead to raise Bank Rate at this December meeting. However, the advent of Omicron potentially threw a spanner into the works as it poses a major headwind to the economy which, of itself, will help to cool the economy. The financial markets, therefore, swung round to expecting no change in Bank Rate.

- **On 15th December we had the CPI inflation** figure for November which spiked up further from 4.2% to 5.1%, confirming again how inflationary pressures have been building sharply. However, Omicron also caused a sharp fall in world oil and other commodity prices; (gas and electricity inflation has generally accounted on average for about 60% of the increase in inflation in advanced western economies).

- **Other elements of inflation are also transitory** e.g., prices of goods being forced up by supply shortages, and shortages of shipping containers due to ports being clogged have caused huge increases in shipping costs. But these issues are likely to clear during 2022, and then prices will subside back to more normal levels. Gas prices and electricity prices will also fall back once winter is passed and demand for these falls away.

- Although it is possible that the Government could step in with some **fiscal support for the economy**, the huge cost of such support to date is likely to pose a barrier to incurring further major expenditure unless it was very limited and targeted on narrow sectors like hospitality. The Government may well, therefore, effectively leave it to the MPC, and to monetary policy, to support economic growth – but at a time when the threat posed by rising inflation is near to peaking!

- This is the adverse set of factors against which the MPC had to decide on Bank Rate. For the second month in a row, the MPC blind-sided financial markets, this time with a **surprise increase in Bank Rate from 0.10% to 0.25%.** What's more, the hawkish tone of comments indicated that the MPC is now concerned that inflationary pressures are indeed building and need concerted action by the MPC to counter. This indicates that there will be more increases to come with financial markets predicting 1% by the end of 2022. The 8-1 vote to raise the rate shows that there is firm agreement that inflation now poses a threat, especially after the CPI figure hit a 10-year high this week. The MPC commented that "there has been significant upside news" and that "there were some signs of greater persistence in domestic costs and price pressures".

- On the other hand, it did also comment that **"the Omicron variant is likely to weigh on near-term activity".** But it stressed that at the November meeting it had said it <u>would</u> raise rates if the economy evolved as it expected and that now "these conditions had been met". It also appeared more worried about the possible boost to inflation form Omicron itself. It said that "the current position of the global and UK economies was materially different compared with prior to the onset of the pandemic, including elevated levels of consumer price inflation". It also noted the possibility that renewed social distancing would boost demand for goods again, (as demand for services would fall), meaning "global price pressures might persist for longer". (Recent news is that the largest port in the world in China has come down with an Omicron outbreak which is not only affecting the port but also factories in the region.)

- On top of that, there were no references this month to inflation being expected to be below the **2% target in two years' time,** which at November's meeting the MPC referenced to suggest the markets had gone too far in expecting interest rates to rise to over 1.00% by the end of the year.

- These comments indicate that there has been a material reappraisal by the MPC of the inflationary pressures since their last meeting and the Bank also increased its forecast for inflation to peak at 6% next April, rather than at 5% as of a month ago. However, as the Bank retained its guidance that only **a "modest tightening"** in policy will be required, it cannot be thinking that it will need to increase interest rates that much more. A typical policy tightening cycle has usually involved rates rising by 0.25% four times in a year. "Modest" seems slower than that. As such, the Bank could be thinking about raising interest rates two or three times next year to 0.75% or 1.00%.

- In as much as a considerable part of the inflationary pressures at the current time are indeed **transitory,** and will naturally subside, and since economic growth is likely to be weak over the next few months, this would appear to indicate that this tightening cycle is likely to be comparatively short.

- As for the timing of the next increase in Bank Rate, the MPC dropped the comment from November's statement that Bank Rate would be raised "in the coming months". That may imply another rise is unlikely at the next meeting in February and that May is more likely. However, much could depend on how adversely, or not, the economy is affected by Omicron in the run up to the next meeting on 3rd February. Once 0.50% is reached, the Bank would act to start shrinking its stock of QE, (gilts purchased by the Bank would not be replaced when they mature).

- **The MPC's forward guidance on its intended monetary policy** on raising Bank Rate versus selling (quantitative easing) holdings of bonds is as follows: -
  Raising Bank Rate as "the active instrument in most circumstances".
  Raising Bank Rate to 0.50% before starting on reducing its holdings.
  Once Bank Rate is at 0.50% it would stop reinvesting maturing gilts.
  Once Bank Rate had risen to at least 1%, it would start selling its holdings.

- **US.** Shortages of goods and intermediate goods like semi-conductors, have been fuelling increases in prices and reducing economic growth potential. In November, **CPI inflation hit a near 40-year record level of 6.8%** but with energy prices then falling sharply, this is probably the peak. The biggest problem for the Fed is the mounting evidence of a strong pick-up in cyclical price pressures e.g., in rent which has hit a decades high.
- **Shortages of labour** have also been driving up wage rates sharply; this also poses a considerable threat to feeding back into producer prices and then into consumer prices inflation. It now also appears that there has been a sustained drop in the labour force which suggests the pandemic has had a longer-term scarring effect in reducing potential GDP. Economic growth may therefore be reduced to between 2 and 3% in 2022 and 2023 while core inflation is likely to remain elevated at around 3% in both years instead of declining back to the Fed's 2% central target.
- Inflation hitting 6.8% and the feed through into second round effects, meant that it was near certain that the **Fed's meeting of 15th December** would take aggressive action against inflation. Accordingly, the rate of tapering of monthly $120bn QE purchases announced at its November 3rd meeting. was doubled so that all purchases would now finish in February 2022. In addition, Fed officials had started discussions on running down the stock of QE held by the Fed. Fed officials also expected three rate rises in 2022 of 0.25% from near zero currently, followed by three in 2023 and two in 2024, taking rates back above 2% to a neutral level for monetary policy. The first increase could come as soon as March 2022 as the chairman of the Fed stated his view that the economy had made rapid progress to achieving the other goal of the Fed – "maximum employment". The Fed forecast that inflation would fall from an average of 5.3% in 2021 to 2.6% in 2023, still above its target of 2% and both figures significantly up from previous forecasts. What was also significant was that this month the Fed dropped its description of the current level of inflation as being "transitory" and instead referred to "elevated levels" of inflation: the statement also dropped most of the language around the flexible average inflation target, with inflation now described as having exceeded 2 percent "for some time". It did not see Omicron as being a major impediment to the need to take action now to curtail the level of inflationary pressures that have built up, although Fed officials did note that it has the potential to exacerbate supply chain problems and add to price pressures.

See also comments in paragraph 4.3 under PWLB rates and gilt yields.

- **EU.** The slow role out of vaccines initially delayed **economic recovery** in early 2021 but the vaccination rate then picked up sharply. After a contraction of -0.3% in Q1, Q2 came in with strong growth of 2%. With Q3 at 2.2%, the EU recovery was then within 0.5% of its pre Covid size. However, the arrival of Omicron is now a major headwind to growth in quarter 4 and the expected downturn into weak growth could well turn negative, with the outlook for the first two months of 2022 expected to continue to be very weak.
- **November's inflation figures** breakdown shows that the increase in price pressures is not just due to high energy costs and global demand-supply imbalances for durable goods as services inflation also rose. Headline inflation reached 4.9% in November, with over half of that due to energy. However, oil and gas prices are expected to fall after the winter and so energy inflation is expected to plummet in 2022. Core goods inflation rose to 2.4% in November, its second highest ever level, and is likely to remain high for some time as it will take a long time for the inflationary impact of global imbalances in the demand and supply of durable goods to disappear. Price pressures also increased in the services sector, but wage growth remains subdued and there are no signs of a trend of faster wage growth which might lead to *persistently* higher services inflation - which would get the ECB concerned. The upshot is that

the euro-zone is set for a prolonged period of inflation being above the ECB's target of 2% and it is likely to average 3% in 2022, in line with the ECB's latest projection.

- **ECB tapering.** The ECB has joined with the Fed by also announcing at its meeting on 16th December that it will be reducing its QE purchases - by half from October 2022, i.e., it will still be providing significant stimulus via QE purchases for over half of next year. However, as inflation will fall back sharply during 2022, it is likely that it will leave its central rate below zero, (currently -0.50%), over the next two years. The main struggle that the ECB has had in recent years is that inflation has been doggedly anaemic in sticking below the ECB's target rate despite all its major programmes of monetary easing by cutting rates into negative territory and providing QE support.
- The ECB will now also need to consider the impact of **Omicron** on the economy, and it stated at its December meeting that it is prepared to provide further QE support if the pandemic causes bond yield spreads of peripheral countries, (compared to the yields of northern EU countries), to rise. However, that is the only reason it will support peripheral yields, so this support is limited in its scope.
- The EU has entered into a **period of political uncertainty** where a new German government formed of a coalition of three parties with Olaf Scholz replacing Angela Merkel as Chancellor in December 2021, will need to find its feet both within the EU and in the three parties successfully working together. In France there is a presidential election coming up in April 2022 followed by the legislative election in June. In addition, Italy needs to elect a new president in January with Prime Minister Draghi being a favourite due to having suitable gravitas for this post. However, if he switched office, there is a significant risk that the current government coalition could collapse. That could then cause differentials between Italian and German bonds to widen when 2022 will also see a gradual running down of ECB support for the bonds of weaker countries within the EU. These political uncertainties could have repercussions on economies and on Brexit issues.

- **CHINA.** After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1 2020, economic recovery was strong in the rest of **2020**; this enabled China to recover all the initial contraction. During 2020, policy makers both quashed the virus and implemented a programme of monetary and fiscal support that was particularly effective at stimulating short-term growth. At the same time, China's economy benefited from the shift towards online spending by consumers in developed markets. These factors helped to explain its comparative outperformance compared to western economies during 2020 and earlier in 2021.
- However, the pace of economic growth has now fallen back in **2021** after this initial surge of recovery from the pandemic and looks likely to be particularly weak in 2022. China has been struggling to contain the spread of the Delta variant through using sharp local lockdowns - which depress economic growth. Chinese consumers are also being very wary about leaving home and so spending money on services. However, with Omicron having now spread to China, and being much more easily transmissible, this strategy of sharp local lockdowns to stop the virus may not prove so successful in future. In addition, the current pace of providing boosters at 100 billion per month will leave much of the 1.4 billion population exposed to Omicron, and any further mutations, for a considerable time.
- The **People's Bank of China** made a start in December 2021 on cutting its key interest rate marginally so as to stimulate economic growth. However, after credit has already expanded by around 25% in just the last two years, it will probably leave the heavy lifting in supporting growth to fiscal stimulus by central and local government.
- Supply shortages, especially of coal for power generation, were causing widespread power cuts to industry during the second half of 2021 and so a sharp disruptive impact on some sectors of the economy. In addition, recent regulatory actions motivated by a political agenda to channel activities into officially approved directions, are also likely to reduce the dynamism and long-term growth of the Chinese economy.

- **JAPAN.** 2021 has been a patchy year in combating Covid. However, recent business surveys indicate that the economy has been rebounding rapidly in 2021 once the bulk of the population had been double vaccinated and new virus cases had plunged. However, Omicron could reverse this initial success in combating Covid.

- The Bank of Japan is continuing its **very loose monetary policy** but with little prospect of getting inflation back above 1% towards its target of 2%, any time soon: indeed, inflation was actually negative in July. New Prime Minister Kishida, having won the November general election, brought in a supplementary budget to boost growth, but it is unlikely to have a major effect.

- **WORLD GROWTH.** World growth was in recession in 2020 but recovered during 2021 until starting to lose momentum in the second half of the year, though overall growth for the year is expected to be about 6% and to be around 4-5% in 2022. Inflation has been rising due to increases in gas and electricity prices, shipping costs and supply shortages, although these should subside during 2022. While headline inflation will fall sharply, core inflation will probably not fall as quickly as central bankers would hope. It is likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a **reversal of world globalisation** and a decoupling of western countries from dependence on China to supply products, and vice versa. This is likely to reduce world growth rates from those in prior decades.

- **SUPPLY SHORTAGES**. The pandemic and extreme weather events, followed by a major surge in demand after lockdowns ended, have been highly disruptive of extended worldwide supply chains. Major queues of ships unable to unload their goods at ports in New York, California and China built up rapidly during quarters 2 and 3 of 2021 but then halved during quarter 4. Such issues have led to a misdistribution of shipping containers around the world and have contributed to a huge increase in the cost of shipping. Combined with a shortage of semi-conductors, these issues have had a disruptive impact on production in many countries. The latest additional disruption has been a shortage of coal in China leading to power cuts focused primarily on producers (rather than consumers), i.e., this will further aggravate shortages in meeting demand for goods. Many western countries are also hitting up against a difficulty in filling job vacancies. It is expected that these issues will be gradually sorted out, but they are currently contributing to a spike upwards in inflation and shortages of materials and goods available to purchase.

Annex D

TREASURY MANAGEMENT PRACTICE: PERMITTED INVESTMENTS, ASSOCIATED CONTROLS AND LIMITS

This Council approves the following forms of investment instrument for use as permitted investments

Treasury risks
All the investment instruments are subject to the following risks: -

1. **Credit and counter-party risk:** this is the risk of failure by a counterparty (bank or building society) to meet its contractual obligations to the organisation particularly as a result of the counterparty's diminished creditworthiness, and the resulting detrimental effect on the organisation's capital or current (revenue) resources. There are no counterparties where this risk is zero although AAA rated organisations have the highest, relative, level of creditworthiness.

2. **Liquidity risk:** this is the risk that cash will not be available when it is needed. While it could be said that all counterparties are subject to at least a very small level of liquidity risk as credit risk can never be zero, in this document, liquidity risk has been treated as whether or not instant access to cash can be obtained from each form of investment instrument. However, it has to be pointed out that while some forms of investment e.g. gilts, CDs, corporate bonds can usually be sold immediately if the need arises, there are two caveats: - a. cash may not be available until a settlement date up to three days after the sale b. there is an implied assumption that markets will not freeze up and so the instrument in question will find a ready buyer.

3. **Market risk:** this is the risk that, through adverse market fluctuations in the value of the principal sums an organisation borrows and invests, its stated treasury management policies and objectives are compromised, against which effects it has failed to protect itself adequately. However, some cash rich local authorities may positively want exposure to market risk e.g. those investing in investment instruments with a view to obtaining a long term increase in value.

4. **Interest rate risk**: this is the risk that fluctuations in the levels of interest rates create an unexpected or unbudgeted burden on the organisation's finances, against which the organisation has failed to protect itself adequately. This authority has set limits for its fixed and variable rate exposure in its Treasury Indicators in this report.

5. **Legal and regulatory risk:** this is the risk that the organisation itself, or an organisation with which it is dealing in its treasury management activities, fails to act in accordance with its legal powers or regulatory requirements, and that the organisation suffers losses accordingly.

Controls on treasury risks

1. **Credit and counter-party risk:** this authority has set minimum credit criteria to determine which counterparties and countries are of sufficiently high creditworthiness to be considered for investment purposes. See paragraphs 5.3 and 5.4.

2. **Liquidity risk:** this authority has a cash flow forecasting model to enable it to determine how long investments can be made for and how much can be invested.

3. **Market risk:** this authority does not purchase investment instruments which are subject to market risk in terms of fluctuation in their value.

4. **Interest rate risk**: this authority manages this risk by having a view of the future course of interest rates and then formulating a treasury management strategy accordingly which aims to maximise investment earnings consistent with control of risk or alternatively, seeks to minimise expenditure on interest costs on borrowing. See paragraph 5.7.

5. **Legal and regulatory risk:** this authority will not undertake any form of investing until it has ensured that it has all necessary powers and also complied with all regulations. All types of investment instruments

Unlimited investments

Regulation 24 states that an investment can be shown as being 'unlimited' in terms of the maximum amount or percentage of the total portfolio that can be put into that type of investment. However, it also requires that an explanation must be given for using that category. The authority has given the following types of investment an unlimited category: -

1. **Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility.** This offers the lowest risk form of investment available to local authorities as it is effectively an investment placed with the Government. It is also easy to use as it is a deposit account and avoids the complications of buying and holding Government issued treasury bills or gilts. As it is low risk it also earns low rates of interest. However, it is very useful for authorities whose overriding priority is the avoidance of risk. The longest period for a term deposit with the DMADF is 6 months.

Annex E

Credit and Counterparty Risk Management
Permitted Investments, Associated Controls and Limits for Scottish Borders Council, Common Good and Trust Funds and In-house Managed Pension Fund

Type of Investment	Treasury Risks	Mitigating Controls	Council Limits	Common Good & Trust Fund Limits	Pension Fund In-House Limits
Cash type instruments					
a. Deposits with the Debt Management Account Facility (UK Government) (**Very low risk)**	This is a deposit with the UK Government and as such counterparty and liquidity risk is very low, and there is no risk to value. Deposits can be between overnight and 6 months.	Little mitigating controls required. As this is a UK Government investment the monetary limit is unlimited to allow for a safe haven for investments	£unlimited, maximum 6 months.	£unlimited, maximum 6 months.	£unlimited, maximum 6 months.
b. Deposits with other local authorities or public bodies **(Very low risk)**	These are considered quasi UK Government debt and as such counterparty risk is very low, and there is no risk to value. Liquidity may present a problem as deposits can only be broken with the agreement of the counterparty, and penalties can apply. Deposits with other non-local authority bodies will be restricted to the overall credit rating criteria.	Little mitigating controls required for local authority deposits, as this is a quasi UK Government investment. Non- local authority deposits will follow the approved credit rating criteria.	£40m, maximum 1 year.	£5m, maximum 1 year.	£40m, maximum 1 year.
c. Money Market Funds (MMFs) **(Very low risk)**	Pooled cash investment vehicle which provides very low counterparty, liquidity and market risk. These will primarily be used as liquidity instruments.	Funds will only be used where the MMFs has a “AAA” rated status from either Fitch, Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s.	£5m per fund/£25m overall	£5m per fund/£25m overall	£5m per fund/£25m overall

Type of Investment	Treasury Risks	Mitigating Controls	Council Limits	Common Good & Trust Fund Limits	Pension Fund In-House Limits
d. Ultra short dated bond funds **(low risk)**	Pooled cash investment vehicle which provides very low counterparty, liquidity and market risk. These will primarily be used as liquidity instruments.	Funds will only be used where they have a "AAA" rated status from either Fitch, Moody's or Standard and Poor's.	N/A	N/A	N/A
e. Call account deposit accounts with financial institutions (banks and building societies) **(Low risk depending on credit rating)**	These tend to be low risk investments, but will exhibit higher risks than categories (a), (b) and (c) above. Whilst there is no risk to value with these types of investments, liquidity is high and investments can be returned at short notice.	The counterparty selection criteria approved above restricts lending only to high quality counterparties, measured primarily by credit ratings from Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. Day to day investment dealing with this criteria will be further strengthened by use of additional market intelligence.	As shown in the counterparty section criteria above.	As shown in the counterparty section criteria above.	As shown in the counterparty section criteria above.
f. Term deposits with financial institutions (banks and building societies) **(Low to medium risk depending on period & credit rating)**	These tend to be low risk investments, but will exhibit higher risks than categories (a), (b) and (c) above. Whilst there is no risk to value with these types of investments, liquidity is low and term deposits can only be broken with the agreement of the counterparty, and penalties may apply.	The counterparty selection criteria approved above restricts lending only to high quality counterparties, measured primarily by credit ratings from Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. Day to day investment dealing with this criteria will be further strengthened by use of additional market intelligence.	As shown in the counterparty section criteria above.	As shown in the counterparty section criteria above.	As shown in the counterparty section criteria above.

Type of Investment	Treasury Risks	Mitigating Controls	Council Limits	Common Good & Trust Fund Limits	Pension Fund In-House Limits
g. Government Gilts and Treasury Bills **(Very low risk)**	These are marketable securities issued by the UK Government and as such counterparty and liquidity risk is very low, although there is potential risk to value arising from an adverse movement in interest rates (no loss if these are held to maturity.	Little counterparty mitigating controls are required, as this is a UK Government investment. The potential for capital loss will be reduced by limiting the maximum monetary and time exposures.	£20m, maximum 1 year.	£5m, maximum 1 year	£20m, maximum 1 year.

Type of Investment	Treasury Risks	Mitigating Controls	Council Limits	Common Good & Trust Fund Limits	Pension Fund In-House Limits
Other types of investments					
a. Investment properties	These are non-service properties which are being held pending disposal or for a longer term rental income stream. These are highly illiquid assets with high risk to value (the potential for property prices to fall or for rental voids).	In larger investment portfolios some small allocation of property based investment may counterbalance/compliment the wider cash portfolio. Property holding will be re-valued regularly and reported annually with gross and net rental streams.	£30m	£25m	N/A
b. Loans to third parties, including soft loans	These are service investments either at market rates of interest or below market rates (soft loans). These types of investments may exhibit credit risk and are likely to be highly illiquid.	Each third party loan requires Member approval and each application is supported by the service rational behind the loan and the likelihood of partial or full default.	£25m	£1m	N/A
c. Loans to a local authority company	These are service investments either at market rates of interest or below market rates (soft loans). These types of investments may exhibit credit risk and are likely to be highly illiquid.	Each loan to a local authority company requires Member approval and each application is supported by the service rational behind the loan and the likelihood of partial or full default.	£25m	N/A	N/A
d. National Housing Trust **(Very Low Risk due to Scottish Government Underwriting)**	These are loans to a Special Purpose Vehicle to allow it to purchase new homes under the NHT umbrella. These loans represent either 65% or 70% of the purchase price, the remainder being funded by the developer. The loan is redeemed after a 5 to	Loan redemption arises when the homes are sold. Interest payments are made to the Council by the SPV from rental payments in the intervening period. Both the loan amount and associated interest payments are underwritten by Scottish Government.	£8m	N/A	N/A

	10 year period when the properties are sold.				
e. Shareholdings in a local authority company	These are service investments which may exhibit market risk and are likely to be highly illiquid.	Each equity investment in a local authority company requires Member approval and each application will be supported by the service rational behind the investment and the likelihood of loss.	£1m	N/A	N/A
f. Investment in the Subordinated Debt of projects delivered via the 'HubCo' model **(Very Low Risk)**	These are investments that are exposed to the success or failure of individual projects and are highly illiquid.	The Council and Scottish Government (via the SFT) are participants in and party to the governance and controls within the project structure. As such they are well placed to influence and ensure the successful completion of the project's term. These projects are based on robust business cases with a cashflow from public sector organisations (i.e. low credit risk)	£600,000	N/A	N/A

The Monitoring of Investment Counterparties

The status of counterparties will be monitored regularly. The Council receives credit rating and market information from Link Group, including when ratings change, and counterparties are checked promptly. On occasion ratings may be downgraded when an investment has already been made. The criteria used are such that a minor downgrading should not affect the full receipt of the principal and interest. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria will be removed from the list immediately by the Director of Finance & Corporate Governance, and if required new counterparties which meet the criteria will be added to the list.

Use of External Fund Managers

It is the Council's policy to use external fund managers to manage the investment portfolios of the Scottish Borders Council Pension Fund and the pooled investment fund of the Common Good and Trust Funds. This Annex reflects the approved policies around the Common Good and Trust Fund Investment Strategy but specifically excludes, as allowed by regulations, the work undertaken by External Fund Managers in relation to the Scottish Borders Council Pension Fund.

Annex F

Approved Countries for Investments

This list is based on those countries which have sovereign ratings of AA- or higher, (we show the lowest rating from Fitch, Moody's and S&P) and also, (except - at the time of writing - for Hong Kong, Norway and Luxembourg), have banks operating in sterling markets which have credit ratings of green or above in the Link credit worthiness service.

Based on lowest available rating

AAA

- Australia
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

AA+

- Canada
- Finland
- U.S.A.

AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France

AA-

- Belgium
- Hong Kong
- Qatar
- **U.K.**

[Ratings provided by Link Group as at 22 December 2021]

Annex G

Scheme of Delegation

(i) Full board/council

- receiving and reviewing reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities;
- approval of annual strategy.

(ii) Boards/committees/council/responsible body

- approval of/amendments to the organisation's adopted clauses, treasury management policy statement and treasury management practices;
- budget consideration and approval;
- approval of the division of responsibilities;
- receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations;
- approving the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.

(iii) Body/person(s) with responsibility for scrutiny

- reviewing the treasury management policy and procedures and making recommendations to the responsible body.

THE TREASURY MANAGEMENT ROLE OF THE SECTION 95 OFFICER

The S95 (responsible) officer

- Take and/or authorise all operational decisions regarding the Council's investments and borrowing, in accordance with approved Treasury Management Policy and Strategy.
- Responsible for execution and administration of treasury management decisions in accordance with the Council's Treasury Management policy statement and Treasury Management Practice, and if (s)he is a CIPFA member, CIPFA's Standard of Professional Practice on Treasury Management.
- In terms of Treasury Management, from time to time, formulate suitable criteria for assessing and monitoring the credit risk of investment counterparties and construct a lending list defining appropriate limits.
- Borrow, in advance of need, where, for instance, a sharp rise in interest rates is expected, and so borrowing early at fixed interest rates will be economically beneficial or meet budgetary constraints. Adopt a cautious approach to any such borrowing, and a business case to support the decision-making process must consider:
    - the benefits of borrowing in advance,
    - the investment risks created by the existence of investments at the same time as additional borrowing being outstanding; and
    - how far in advance it is reasonable to borrow, considering the risks identified. Any such advance borrowing shall be reported through the mid-year or annual Treasury Management reporting mechanism.
- Take the most appropriate form of borrowing depending on the prevailing interest rates at the time, taking into account the risks shown in the forecast contained in the Treasury Management Strategy.
- Maintain a counterparty list consistent with the Investment Counterparty Selection Criteria and revise the criteria and submit them to Committee for approval as necessary, and in addition, set out the types of investment to be made (Permitted Investments).

- preparation of a capital strategy to include capital expenditure, capital financing, non-financial investments and treasury management, with a long-term timeframe
- ensuring that the capital strategy is prudent, sustainable, affordable and prudent in the long term and provides value for money
- ensuring that due diligence has been carried out on all treasury and non-financial investments and is in accordance with the risk appetite of the authority
- ensure that the authority has appropriate legal powers to undertake expenditure on non-financial assets and their financing
- ensuring the proportionality of all investments so that the authority does not undertake a level of investing which exposes the authority to an excessive level of risk compared to its financial resources
- ensuring that an adequate governance process is in place for the approval, monitoring and ongoing risk management of all non-financial investments and long term liabilities
- provision to members of a schedule of all non-treasury investments including material investments in subsidiaries, joint ventures, loans and financial guarantees ensuring that members are adequately informed and understand the risk exposures taken on by an authority
- ensuring that the authority has adequate expertise, either in house or externally provided, to carry out the above
- creation of Treasury Management Practices which specifically deal with how non- treasury investments will be carried out and managed, to include the following *(TM Code p54): -*
    - *Risk management (TMP1 and schedules), including investment and risk management criteria for any material non-treasury investment portfolios;*
    - *Performance measurement and management (TMP2 and schedules), including methodology and criteria for assessing the performance and success of non-treasury investments;*
    - *Decision making, governance and organisation (TMP5 and schedules), including a statement of the governance requirements for decision making in relation to non-treasury investments; and arrangements to ensure that appropriate professional due diligence is carried out to support decision making;*
    - *Reporting and management information (TMP6 and schedules), including where and how often monitoring reports are taken;*
    - *Training and qualifications (TMP10 and schedules), including how the relevant knowledge and skills in relation to non-treasury investments will be arranged.*

ANNEX H

Long Term (30 Yr) Loans Charges Analysis

Current capital and revenue plans have been extrapolated over a 30 year period in order to assess the impact on the revenue Loans Charges budget. In line with assumptions made when assessing external debt and associated limits as described in paragraph 5.3 of the covering report, long term capital planning will cause a pressure on the loans charges budget from financial year 2031/32, as detailed in the chart below. Movements in notional loans charges associated with internal borrowing also impact on these figures.

It should be noted that from 2032-33, the first year outwith the current 10 year Capital Plan, a 10 year average capital expenditure, and annual borrowing requirement of £10.5m, has been assumed.



ANNEX I

Credit Ratings

Long and Short Term Credit Ratings

Audit Commission Grading#	**Fitch**		**Moody's**		**Standard and Poor's**	
	Long Term	**Short Term**	**Long Term**	**Short Term**	**Long Term**	**Short Term**
Extremely strong grade	AAA	F1+	Aaa	P-1	AAA	A-1+
Very strong grade	AA+ AA AA-	F1+ F1+ F1+	Aa1 Aa2 Aa3	P-1 P-1 P-1	AA+ AA AA-	A-1+ A-1+ A-1+
Strong grade But susceptible to adverse conditions	A+ A A-	F1+ / F1 F1 F1	A1 A2 A3	P-1 P-1 / P-2 P-1 / P-2	A+ A A	A-1+ / A-1 A-1 A-1 / A-2
Adequate Grade	BBB+ BBB BBB-	F2 F2 / F3 F3	Baa1 Baa2 Baa3	P-2 P-2 / P-3 P-3	BBB+ BBB BBB-	A-2 A-2 / A-3 A-2
Speculative Grade	BB+ BB BB-	B B B	Ba1 Ba2 Ba3	NP * NP NP	BB+ BB BB-	B-1 B-2 B-3
Very Speculative Grade	B+ B B-	B B B	Ba1 Ba2 Ba3	NP NP NP	B+ B B-	- - -
Vulnerable Grade	CCC CCC CCC CC C	C C C C C	Caa1 Caa2 Caa3 - Ca	NP NP NP NP NP	CCC+ CCC CCC- CC C	C C C C C
Defaulting Grade	D	D	C	NP	D	D

for the purpose of standardisation based on Standard and Poor's credit rating definitions.
* NP – Not Prime

Source: Audit Commission adaptation of information from Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poor's

Benchmarking and Monitoring Security, Liquidity and Yield

The consideration and approval of security and liquidity benchmarks are also part of Member reporting. These benchmarks are targets and so may be breached from time to time. Any breach will be reported, with supporting reasons, in the annual treasury report.

Yield
These benchmarks are currently widely used to assess investment performance. Local measures of yield benchmarks are:

- Investments – **Internal returns above the 7 day SONIA compounded rate**

Security and liquidity benchmarks are already intrinsic to the approved treasury strategy through the counterparty selection criteria and some of the prudential indicators. Benchmarks for the cash type investments are below. In the other investment categories, appropriate benchmarks will be used where available.

Liquidity
This is defined as an organisation "having adequate, though not excessive, cash resources, borrowing arrangements, overdrafts or standby facilities to enable it at all times to have the level of funds available to it which are necessary for the achievement of its business/service objectives" (CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice). In respect of liquidity, the Council seeks to maintain:

- Bank overdraft - £250,000
- Liquid short term deposits of at least £1,500,000 available with a week's notice.

The availability of liquidity in the portfolio can be benchmarked by the monitoring of the Weighted Average Life (WAL) of the portfolio – shorter WAL would generally embody less risk. In this respect, the proposed benchmark to be used is:

- **WAL benchmark is expected to be 0.5 years, with a maximum of 1.00 years**.

Security of the investments
In the context of benchmarking, assessing security is a much more subjective area to assess. Security is currently evidenced by the application of minimum credit quality criteria to investment counterparties, primarily through the use of the Creditworthiness service provided by Link Group. Whilst this approach embodies security considerations, benchmarking levels of risk is more problematic. One method to benchmark security risk is to assess the historic level of default against the minimum criteria used in the Council's investment strategy.

The Council's maximum security risk benchmark for the whole portfolio, when compared to these historic default tables, is:

- **0.04% historic risk of default when compared to the whole portfolio.**

These benchmarks are embodied in the criteria for selecting cash investment counterparties and these will be monitored and reported to Members in the Annual Treasury Management Report. As this data is collated, trends and analysis will be collected and reported.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

CIPFA	Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy
CIPFA Code	Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice and Cross-Sectoral Guidance Notes
CFR	Capital Financing Requirement is the estimated level of borrowing or financing needed to fund capital expenditure.
Consent to Borrow	Para 1 (1) of Schedule 3 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1975 (the 1975 Act) effectively restricts local authorities to borrowing only for capital expenditure. Under the legislation Scottish Ministers may provide consent for local authorities to borrow for expenditure not covered by this paragraph, where they are satisfied that the expenditure should be met by borrowing.
Gilts	A gilt is a UK Government liability in sterling, issued by HM Treasury and listed on the London Stock Exchange. The term “gilt” or “gilt-edged security” is a reference to the primary characteristic of gilts as an investment: their security. This is a reflection of the fact that the British Government has never failed to make interest or principal payments on gilts as they fall due.
LIBID	London Interbank Bid Rate The rate at which banks bid on Eurocurrency Deposits, being the rate at which a bank is willing to borrow from other banks.
MPC	Monetary Policy Committee
NHT	National Housing Trust initiative undertaken in partnership with the Scottish Futures Trust.
Other Long Term Liabilities	Balance sheet items such as Public Private Partnership (PPP), and leasing arrangements which already include borrowing instruments.
PPP	Public-Private Partnership.
Prudential Indicators	The Prudential Code sets out a basket of indicators (the Prudential Indicators) that must be prepared and used in order to demonstrate that local authorities have fulfilled the objectives of the Prudential Code.
QE	Quantitative Easing
Treasury Indicators	These consist of a number of Treasury Management Indicators that local authorities are expected to ‘have regard’ to, to demonstrate compliance with the Treasury Management Code of Practice.

You can get this document on tape, in Braille, large print and various computer formats by contacting the address below.

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